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This paper summarizes and extends our recent work using life satisfaction regressions to estimate
the relative values of financial and non-financial job characteristics. The well-being results show strikingly
large values for non-financial job characteristics, especially workplace trust and other measures of
the quality of social capital in workplaces. For example, an increase of trust in management that is
about one tenth of the scale is equivalent to more than 30% increase in monetary income. We find
that these values differ significantly by gender and by union status. We consider the reasons for such
large values, and explore their implications for employers, employees, and policy-makers.
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1. Well-being and the Workplace: Setting the Stage 
 
Much of the recent empirical and theoretical analysis of social capital (e.g. Putnam 2000, 
Helliwell and Putnam 2004) has concentrated on interactions in families and 
communities, with only limited attention paid to the nature and consequences of social 
capital in the workplace. Since that earlier research showed the great importance of social 
capital to subjective well-being, it seemed likely that it would also be worthwhile to 
collect evidence about social capital in the workplace, given the large fraction of waking 
hours spent there. Hence we devoted a fresh section of the second wave of the Canadian 
ESC survey to evaluating life on the job, and Putnam has recently completed a new 
survey with life in the workplace as its focus.  
 
In two earlier papers (Helliwell and Huang 2009a, Helliwell, Huang and Putnam 2009), 
we presented results from the second wave (2002~2003) of the Canadian Equality, 
Security and Community (ESC) survey, along with more limited workplace results based 
on the larger Canadian General Social Survey (GSS) of 2002, and Robert Putnam’s US 
Social Capital Benchmark survey. In those papers, and in the results reported in this 
paper, we base our analysis on those who held paid jobs at the time of the survey. There 
are roughly 2,500, 9,000 and 16,500 employed respondents included in our results for the 
ESC, GSS and Benchmark samples, respectively. Appendix 1 shows the sample means 
and standard deviations for the key variables used. 
 
The earlier papers provided estimates of the values of various aspects of life on the job, 
measured as ‘compensating differentials’. The methodology is described fully in 
Helliwell and Huang (2009a). The basic idea is fairly simple. Measures of life 
satisfaction (or of happiness in the case of the Benchmark survey) are used as dependent 
variables, with the independent variables including those variables thought to have 
important implications for life satisfaction. If the influence of income on life satisfaction 
is significant, then the income-equivalent values of other significant determinants can be 
measured as the size of the change in income that would have the same well-being effect 
as a given change in the other variable of interest.    2 2
 
The estimates of compensating differentials for non-financial job characteristics, and 
especially of workplace trust, are strikingly large. For example, results from the ESC 
survey suggest that having a job in a workplace where trust in management is ranked 1 
point higher on a 10-point scale has the equivalent effect on life satisfaction as a 36% 
change in income (Helliwell, Huang and Putnam 2009).  We also explored some reasons 
why both workers and managements might not have been sufficiently aware of these 
effects to induce them to pay more effective attention to building and maintaining 
workplace trust. 
 
In that paper we also attempted to explain some of the possible determinants of 
workplace trust. One of the more striking findings was that union workers tend to rate 
trust in management in their workplaces lower than do non-union workers, by 1.2 points 
on a ten-point scale (t=12.5). However, despite the fact that workplace trust is very 
important for life satisfaction, and trust in management (although not trust in co-workers) 
is substantially lower for union workers, union workers do not, on average, have lower 
levels of life satisfaction.  
 
In this paper we extend our earlier work by assessing how the results differ by union stats 
and by gender. First we attempt to explain why union workers are as satisfied with life as 
non-union workers, despite working in environments where they judge management to be 
less trustworthy. Second, we look for, and find, interesting gender differences in the ways 
in which male and female workers choose and evaluate their workplaces. We were 
inspired to do this by Nicole Fortin’s recent analysis (Fortin 2005, based on World 
Values Survey data) suggesting that some important part of the male-female earning gap 
might be based on deliberate choices by female workers favouring jobs with lower 
income and better working conditions. If her conjectures are more generally applicable, 
they would suggest that female workers attach higher life-satisfaction value to non-
financial job characteristics than do males, and that they might therefore take jobs with 
higher values of trust and other non-financial job characteristics, but with lower earnings. 
In the ESC data there is at least some initial support for this interpretation, as female   3 3
employees rate trust in management at their workplaces higher than do men, with the 
gender difference being the same whether the employees are union members or not. This 
is not simply due to women being more trusting than men, as there is no significant 
gender difference in social trust, trust in police, or trust in neighbours
1. If we find 
significant male/female differences in relative preferences for income and non-financial 
job characteristics, then this might help to explain, following Fortin’s conjectures, some 
part of the remaining earnings gap between genders. 
 
2. Using Life Satisfaction Data to Value Workplace Social Capital  
We are going to use ‘compensating differentials’ to measure the values of workplace 
social capital. There have been many previous attempts in the literature to value non-
financial aspects of jobs using wages or incomes as the dependent variable. Many are 
based on cross-sectional studies using data at the level of individual workers. There are 
econometric problems in this approach caused by the problem of unobservable ability.  
 
Consider an estimation equation with earnings on the left-hand side as the dependent 
variable: 
 (1)    ln(yi)= α  -    βXi   +  γ Zi + θZui + εi  
where  yi is the earnings level for worker i,  Xi is a vector of job characteristics, applicable 
to worker i’s job, with compensating differentials estimated by the coefficient vector β. 
The Zi  are measured characteristics of worker i. The error term has two parts. εi is the 
idiosyncratic term related to the skill level of worker i, and Zui are other unmeasured 
characteristics of the worker, the job, or the market environment in which the wage is 
being paid.  
 
                                                 
1 If the 10-point trust-in-management responses are regressed on gender and union status, the coefficients 
are -1.21 for union membership and -.22 for males. Repeating the same regression for general social trust 
shows social trust slightly higher for union members (+.035, on a 0 to 1 scale, t=1.7), but the same for 
males and females. There are no gender or union differences to the ESC answers to questions asking 
respondents to estimate the likelihood of their lost wallets being returned if found, alternatively, by a 
neighbour or by a police officer.   4 4
We can start from a worker’s theoretical optimization problem and show that the 
unobserved ability affects both the earnings of the worker and the characteristics of the 
chosen job
2. The worker solves: 
 
Max(yi, Xi)U(yi, Xi) 
s.t. ωi= yi + βXi 
 
where U(.,.) is the utility function. The two arguments are income and non-financial job 
attributes in that order. Positive elements in the vector of job attributes Xi enhance utility, 
and vice versa. We assume that jobs differ in their characteristics and that employees can 
choose between a more interesting or engaging job with a lower wage and a less pleasant 
environment with a higher wage. The labour market is presumed to offer potential 
workers many different packages, with prices of job attributes as denoted by the vector β. 
The budget constraint requires that the money wage and the cost (or benefit if negative) 
of the chosen job attributes should sum to the total earning potential of the worker, 
denoted as ωi.  
 
The solution to this maximization has to satisfy the following three-equation system 
including the first order condition for chosen wage, the first order condition for the 
chosen job attributes, and the budget constraint, respectively written: 
 
(2)    ∂U(yi, Xi)/∂yi =λi 
(3)    ∂U(yi, Xi) /∂Xi =λiβ 
         ωi= yi +βXi 
where λi is the Lagrangian multiplier. 
 
A solution of this system gives optimal choice of yi and Xi , both of which are functions 
of the compensating differentials β, and the unobservable skill level ωi  
 
yi = yi(ωi, β);   with ∂yi /∂ωi >0;  ∂yi/∂β >0 
                                                 
2    A similar way of showing the problem is familiar. See, for example, Hwang, Reed and Hubbard 
(1992).   5 5
Xi = Xi(ωi, β);   with ∂Xi/∂ωi >0; ∂Xi/∂β <0 
 
By substituting the optimal choices back into the budget constraint and moving the wage 
to the left hand side, we have the relation between wage and job attributes in the 
equilibrium that is underlying equation (1): 
 
yi(ωi, β)= - βXi(ωi, β)+ ωi 
 
With cross-sectional data, the unobservable earning potential ωi becomes part of the error 
term, thus leaving the error term correlated with both the dependent wage variable and 
the job characteristics used as independent variables. The estimation of β will thus be 
biased downward. For instance, suppose that job safety is included among the X 
variables. With the usual theoretical presumption that safety is a normal good, workers 
possessing higher than average abilities use their extra bargaining power to obtain jobs 
that are both safer and more highly paid. In the absence of a variable measuring ability, 
this behaviour would lead to an upward bias on the coefficient measuring the effects of 
education (assuming ability and education to be positive correlated) and a bias towards 
zero on the coefficients of variables measuring job safety. In the absence of variables 
measuring worker education and training, the downward bias in the estimation of the 
compensating variation for safety would probably be even greater.  
 
Data from one of the surveys used in this paper can be used to illustrate the reality of this 
problem, and show also that attempts to remove the bias in the estimation of 
compensating differentials by allowing for the effects of education on income are likely 
to be insufficient. In the Canadian Equality, Security and Community (ESC) survey, for 
example, working respondents are asked to measure the extent to which their jobs possess 
five job characteristics and one workplace characteristic that are presumed (and 
subsequently found) to have a positive influence on job satisfaction, independent of the 
level of income. Each respondent is asked whether their job: allows them to make a lot of 
decisions on their own, requires a high level of skill, has a variety of tasks, provides 
enough time to get the job done, and is free of conflicting demands. The answers are   6 6
given on a four-point scale, converted to a 0 to 1 scale for the analysis presented below. 
Respondents are also asked, this time on a scale of 1 to 10, to rate the level of trust that 
workers have in management at their workplace. Of these six factors, three have positive 
correlations with income (decision scope, skill and variety), while the other three have 
negative correlations. This pattern holds whether the correlations with income are 
measured individually or jointly, and occur whether or not the substantial effects of 
education on income are allowed for in the way depicted by equation 1
3.  
 
The econometric difficulties posed by using wage equations to identify compensating 
differentials suggest that it might be more promising to use subjective well-being data as 
a direct measure of utility, thereby permitting compensating differentials to be estimated 
as ratios of coefficients estimating the well-being effects of income and job 
characteristics. We do this by combining equations (2) and (3), the two first-order 
conditions of the worker’s maximization problem. Noting that the compensating 
differentials, β, are simply the ratios of the marginal utilities of job attributes over the 
marginal utility of income, i.e.,  
 
β =[∂U(yi, Xi) /∂Xi ]/[∂U(yi, Xi)/∂yi ] 
 
Easy as it sounds, this approach will not be available unless utility is measured in a 
meaningful way so that the marginal contributions of income and job characteristics can 
be estimated. This is precisely where our dataset fits in. Each of the three surveys we use 
includes a question that asks respondents to report their satisfaction with life. We suggest 
that this measure of life satisfaction, subject to some issues we shall deal with later, can 
be used as a direct measure of utility. The measurement of utility permits the estimation 
of marginal utilities, and hence of compensating differentials. This approach avoids the 
difficulties posed by unobserved skills, since theoretically all utility-maximizing 
                                                 
3   If a version of equation 1 is estimated using all six job characteristics and three education level 
variables, the sign patterns are as described in the text. Of the ‘correctly’ (negatively) signed job 
characteristics, “free of conflicting demands” is insignificant. See the Appendix of Helliwell and Huang 
(2009a) for details.   7 7
individuals, of whatever level of ability, will set the ratio of marginal utilities to the 
prevailing market price.  
 
More precisely, our proposed approach is to estimate the marginal contributions of job 
characteristics and income to life satisfaction, and to calculate the compensating 
differentials directly from these estimated coefficients, as ratios of the job characteristics’ 
coefficients to the coefficient on the (log of) income. To the extent that jobs are actually 
available with the characteristics in question, these ratios reflect the prevailing market 
prices of job attributes, usually described as compensating differentials. Essentially the 
same approach has been applied by Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) to estimate 
compensating differentials for aircraft noise in the neighbourhoods surrounding 
Amsterdam Airport, and by Frey and Stutzer (2004) to value commuting time. 
  
In its general form, the proposed strategy is described by 
LSi = δΦy(yi) + μΦx(Xi)  +  γ Zi +εi 
β = μ/ δ 
Where LS is the mnemonic for life satisfaction, Φy(y) is the functional form on income, 
Φx(X) is the functional form for job attributes, and  Zi are all other controls. These 
functional forms accommodate a concave utility. In the case of income, we measure it in 
its log form instead of its level to reflect standard economic assumptions and many 
empirical results suggesting that less affluent agents derive greater utility from extra 
income. Therefore Φy(y)=log(y). For job attributes we adopt a simplistic view that their 
per unit contribution to workers is the same regardless of income or level of X, so that  
Φx(Xi)= Xi. Finally we use Zi to control for many observed heterogeneities across agents, 
including, in some tests, personality differences.   
 
We take into account the functional form in expressing compensating differentials. For 
instance, in our empirically preferred case where income is in log form and X is in linear 
form, β will be the log change in income (we convert to percentage changes in our key 
tables of results) that has for the average employee the same life satisfaction effect as a 
change in the non-financial job characteristic X.    8 8
 
3. Data and Empirical Implementation 
Our three survey sources include the second wave (2002~2003) of the SSHRC-supported 
Equality, Security, and Community survey (ESC hereafter, and described in more detail 
in Soroka et al 2006) the Statistics Canada 2003 General Social Survey (GSS) and the 
2001 US Social Capital Benchmark Survey. The surveys differ in their sample size and 
the nature and number of questions asked. For the results reported in this paper, we 
generally restrict our analysis to the working population, roughly 2500 for the second 
wave of the ESC, 9000 for the GSS, and 13,000 for the US Benchmark. The same life 
satisfaction question is asked in both Canadian surveys: “In general, how satisfied are 
you with your life as a whole these days, on a scale of 1 to 10” . The Benchmark survey 
asks about the respondent’s happiness, on a 4-point scale. For the survey-ordered probit 
regressions we use in this paper, this difference in scales has no effect on the ratios of 
coefficients, and it is these ratios that provide the raw material for our calculation of 
compensating differentials. Life satisfaction questions tend to elicit answers that are more 
reflective of life circumstances, and less reflective of ephemeral events, than do 
happiness questions. However, as is shown in Helliwell and Putnam (2004), where World 
Values Survey answers to both questions were compared, the same broad pattern of 
results appears, thus enabling us in this paper to compare at least roughly the US and 
Canadian effects of workplace trust. 
Equation (4) is designed to estimate compensating differentials for specific job 
characteristics.  
(4) LSi = α  + δ1ln (yi) +  μXi   +  γ Zi + θZui + εi 
 
LSi is life satisfaction (or happiness in the case of the US Benchmark Survey) for 
respondent i, measured on a scale of 1 to 10, yi is the level of income of the respondent’s 
household (personal income in ESC), and the other variables are as in equation (1), 
except that the coefficients now measure their impact on life satisfaction rather than on 
wages, and the variable set is expanded to include all other determinants of life 
satisfaction. When we use equation (4) to estimate the value of job characteristics, we 
will do so by taking the ratio of a coefficient on one of the components of the job   9 9
characteristic vector X to δ1 , the coefficient on log income. This matches the functional 
form assumptions implicit in most previous attempts to evaluate job characteristics using 
wage equations. It presumes that for each worker the monetary value of a change in some 
job characteristic is measured as a fraction of his or her income, which in turn implies 
that higher-income households are prepared to give up more dollars to obtain a higher 
level of non-financial job satisfaction. We report in Helliwell and Huang (2009a) on the 
fit and implications of alternative functional forms, finding that this simple form 
performs well against more complex alternatives. In any event, all of the versions we 
have considered give us similar basic results. 
 
We try to control for as many as possible of the direct determinants of utility, so that our 
estimates of the effects of income and workplace characteristics should be relatively 
accurate, and hence useful for constructing estimates of the income-equivalent values of 
various elements of workplace social capital. These control variables include gender, age, 
and marital status, as well as level of education, immigration and ethnic information. 
They also include a measure of self perceived health status (scale 1 to 5, with 5 
representing the best of health), which we believe not only control for physical health, but 
also psychological health and some unobserved personality differences. Furthermore, we 
have information from all three surveys about the respondent’s frequency of contacts 
with family members outside household, with friends, and with neighbours, and also the 
number of memberships (or extent of activity) in voluntary organizations. These 
measures are all scaled between zero and one, although they are not defined in the same 
way across all three surveys, so their coefficients are not strictly comparable across 
surveys. But they all serve the same purpose, which is to control for factors that are likely 
to affect life satisfaction, thereby making the coefficients on income and jobs as 
comparable as possible across the three surveys
4. We use survey-ordered probit 
estimation with errors presumed to be clustered at the level of the census tract to allow 
for omitted community-level determinants of life satisfaction. Although the probit and 
linear forms give similar results for compensating differentials, the probit form is perhaps 
                                                 
4   For more information about these controls, and how they influence life satisfaction, see Helliwell 
(2003, 2006) and Helliwell and Putnam (2004).   10 1
more convincing, since it permits us to drop the cardinality assumption required for the 
linear form.  
 
The ESC, GSS and Benchmark surveys all contain some measure or measures of 
workplace trust. The ESC asks about the extent to which management can be trusted in 
the respondent’s workplace, while the GSS and Benchmark surveys ask to what extent 
there is trust among colleagues. Figure 1 shows a cross-tabulation of trust in management 
and life satisfaction for all employed respondents to the second wave of the ESC survey. 
The figure shows both that trust in management is generally high among the ESC 
respondents (6.7 on a ten-point scale- see Appendix Table 1) and that life satisfaction is 
significantly higher among those who work where they rank management trustworthiness 
highly. For example, the roughly one-quarter of paid workers who rate trust in 
management at 9 or 10 on a ten point scale report life satisfaction of 8.3 on a ten-point 
scale, compared to an average of 7.5 for the slightly larger number of workers who rate 
trust in management at 5 or below. 
 
4. Basic Results 
The basic well-being equations are shown in Table 1, with the ESC in column 1, the GSS 
in column 2, and the US Benchmark in column 3. The corresponding ESC estimates of 
compensating differentials for workplace trust are shown in the first column of Table 3.   
Although there is an extensive literature on the determinants of job satisfaction, there has 
been less study of the role of workplace trust and social capital as contributors to either 
job or life satisfaction. In a parallel way, most studies of social capital and its effects have 
concentrated on the influence of family, friends, and community groups, with much less 
attention thus far paid to either the causes or the consequences of workplace social capital 
(Halpern 2005). Given the large fraction of waking hours spent in the workplace, it 
should perhaps be expected that workplace social capital might be strongly linked to life 
satisfaction.  
 
The social capital literature (see Halpern 2005 for a recent review) gives a central place 
to trust, with high levels of trust being positively related to other measures of social   11 1
capital (and sometimes being used themselves as either proxy or direct measures of social 
capital), with causation likely to flow both ways (Putnam 2000). The well-being 
equations in this paper suggest that several different sorts of trust have direct effects on 
well-being. The fact that a variety of domain-specific trust measures have even greater 
well-being effects than do responses to the canonical general trust question gives us 
confidence that the large effects of workplace trust on well-being are not simply due to 
influence of congenital optimism on both trust and reported well-being. 
 
The estimated compensating differentials for workplace trust shown in the first column of 
Table 3 are large in magnitude and in statistical significance. For the whole sample of 
workers, a change in trust in management of just one-third of a standard deviation (about 
0.7 points on the 10-point scale, covering about 10% of the sample) has the same life 
satisfaction effect as a 31% change in income (with a t-value of 4.5). The coefficients 
from the GSS and the US Benchmark survey, shown in Table 1, imply compensating 
differentials for trust in co-workers in the Benchmark that are very similar to those for 
trust in management in the ESC, while the effects are even larger for the GSS, driven by 
a significantly smaller income effect in the GSS than in the ESC.   
 
In the second column of Table 2, we augment the basic ESC life satisfaction equation by 
including other aspects of workplace life, and in Helliwell and Huang (2009a), we 
estimated the compensating differential for these factors. As can be seen from Table 2, 
jobs that require skill, have variety, have sufficient time available for completion, and are 
free of conflicting demands are associated with significantly higher life satisfaction, 
while  those that involve a lot of decision-making do not increase life satisfaction. As we 
show in Helliwell and Huang (2009a) jobs that involve a lot of decision-making are 
associated with higher levels of job satisfaction, but these are lost in the conversion to life 
as a whole, presumably because of offsetting stresses on the home front. 
 
 In the following sections of this paper, we extend our previous work by analyzing the 
relation between trust in management and life satisfaction disaggregated by the union   12 1
status and gender, since these were two dimensions on which we found significant 
differences in the observed pattern of relations between workplace trust and well-being.  
 
 
5. Workplace Trust and Union Status  
Figure 2 shows how trust in management differs as between union and non-union 
workers in the ESC sample, while Appendix Table 1 shows the means and standard 
deviations of the data. There are two striking features apparent in the raw data. First, as 
shown in the Appendix Table, the one-third of the sample respondents who are union 
members (reflecting the current national average unionization rate) rate trust in 
management, on average, at just under 6.0 on a ten-point scale, compared to 7.1 for the 
non-union workers. This is not because union workers are generally either an unhappy or 
a non-trusting lot, as their average life satisfaction is just as high as that of non-union 
workers, while their general social trust, trust in neighbours and trust in police are equal 
to or higher than those of non-union workers. 
 
Second, the increase in well-being associated with being in a job where trust in 
management is rated more highly is significantly greater for non-union than for union 
workers, as shown by the steeper slope apparent in Figure 2. In addition, as would be 
suggested by the previous paragraph, when the respondents are sorted according to their 
answers to the question about trust in management, union workers are on average more 
satisfied with their lives than are non-union workers. This follows from the facts already 
noted, that the two groups of workers are on average about equally happy, while the 
union workers rate trust in management lower than do non-union workers. 
 
There are several possible reasons that might be contributing to these patterns. First, low-
trust workplaces are likely to have more dissatisfied workers, and to provide a climate 
more open to establishment of a bargaining unit. Second, the climate of management-
employee relations may be exacerbated in a union environment, since at least some of the 
company and union representatives have the maintenance of adversarial relations as an 
essential part of their jobs. To the extent this is true, one might expect to find that the   13 1
lower trust in management found among union workers is not matched by low trust 
among colleagues. Although we do not have surveys asking about both trust in 
management and trust among colleagues, we do find that in the US Benchmark survey 
there is no difference between union and non-union workers in the extent to which they 
feel trust in their fellow workers. This suggests that there is a special link between trust in 
management and unionization, with the correlation perhaps reflecting causation running 
in both directions. 
 
Third, the fact that union workers more frequently rate trust in management lower than 
non-union workers, but are no less happy on average, probably reflects some element of 
sorting, with those less bothered by a low trust working environment taking union jobs 
with their related combination of higher pay and lower trust in management.  
 
Fourth, the fact that union workers are happier than non-union workers in environments 
where trust in management is low (see figure 2, especially the first column) may also 
mean that unions are doing their jobs, in the sense that they have negotiated contracts and 
grievance procedures to protect their members against at least some of the risks of 
working where management is not trusted by workers. 
 
Some combination of the third and fourth reasons probably lies behind our finding that 
the estimated compensating differentials for trust in management are twice as high for 
non-union as they are for union workers, as shown in the right-hand columns of Table 3.  
  
6. Gender Differences: Trust Matters More for Females 
The difference between union and non-union workers is to a lesser extent mirrored by 
that between male and female workers, with females, like non-union workers, being more 
likely to be working in jobs where trust in management is rated higher, and apparently 
gaining more (in terms of higher life satisfaction) from working in a high-trust 
environment. This is not simply the same phenomenon with a different name, because in 
the ESC sample, and in the Canadian economy as a whole, the percent of females 
working in union jobs is almost exactly the same as for males. The lack of interaction   14 1
effects suggests that the two situations are sufficiently independent to be analyzed 
separately. The magnitudes of the male/female and the union/non-union differences in the 
estimated values attached to trust in management are strikingly similar. Table 3 shows 
female workers to attach income-equivalent life satisfaction values for trust in 
management that are twice as high as for male workers. This is exactly as was found 
when we compared non-union and union workers. In both cases the differences in 
compensating differentials result from females, and non-union workers, attaching a lower 
value to income and a higher value to trust in management than do male or union 
workers. For women, as compared to non-union workers, more of the effect flows 
through the income coefficients, and less through trust in management, but these 
differences are too small to be significant.  
 
As noted in the first section of the paper, Nicole Fortin (2005) has already found some 
evidence in OECD countries that women are more likely to value jobs that have lower 
pay and more flexible working conditions. This appears to be entirely consistent with our 
findings, as workplaces where trust in management is high are workplaces where flexible 
working arrangements are more likely to be in place and working smoothly. Informal 
interviews with female workers in high trust jobs, many of which offered lower pay but 
higher trust than previous jobs, showed that a large part of the value of the high-trust 
environment lay in the ease with which flexible working arrangements, including several 
features of child-rearing, could be obtained without fear or hassle. It is also possible that 
there are more basic gender differences in the values attached to working in jobs with 
high levels of trust. Our current results do not allow us to distinguish the relative 
importance of gender-based personality differences and gender-based differences in life 
circumstances.  
 
In the meantime, our results do suggest that at least some part of the male/female gap in 
money wages is offset for females by working in high-trust jobs. Thus we find, as shown 
in Appendix 1, that although female workers in our sample earn less per hour worked, 
they have equal or greater satisfaction with their jobs and their lives, and are in jobs 
where the trustworthiness of management is rated more highly. It is possible to use our   15 1
coefficient estimates to calculate what fraction of the hourly earnings difference between 
males and females might be compensated for by the difference in trust in management. 
Using the compensating differentials in Table 3, as seen from a female perspective, the 
higher average assessments of trust in management in the jobs held by females have a life 
satisfaction effect almost two-fifths as large as those attributable to the higher average 




Our estimates in Helliwell and Huang (2009a) were the first we know of to provide 
income-equivalent values for workplace trust. The estimated values of trust in the 
workplace are very large, and remain so even when we make a number of adjustments 
designed to remove risks of over-estimation. Our workplace trust results are 
independently estimated from two Canadian and one US survey using different samples 
and different question wordings. That all three surveys should show such consistently 
large effects convinces us of the robustness of our results. In this paper we have built on 
subsequent extensions by Helliwell, Huang and Putnam (2009) and Helliwell and Huang 
(2009b) to disaggregate and report results by gender and union status.  
 
There is much more to be done, in collecting fresh samples of data and especially in 
developing survey sources that will provide data linking individual subjective 
assessments of workplace quality and life satisfaction with workplace-based information 
about the structure of specific places of employment. We think that the strength and 
consistency of our results to date is sufficient to support more research in these 
directions. Perhaps it may already be enough to convince workers and managers to pay 
                                                 
5 In the fourth column of Table 2, which has the regression result for female workers, the coefficient on the 
standardized trust in management is 1.31 times of the coefficient on log of personal income. This implies 
that we can multiply the difference in standardized trust by 1.31 to turn it into income-equivalent units. The 
gender difference in the average assessment of trust in management is 0.13, with females being higher. The 
difference amounts to 0.057 standardized units. The corresponding income-equivalent value is therefore 
0.057*1.31=0.075. The gender difference in personal income per hour of work is 0.19, with females being 
lower. Therefore the difference in workplace trust contributes almost two-fifths ( 0.075/0.19=0.39) of the 
gender difference in hourly earnings.   16 1
more attention to workplace trust
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in management;  Paid workers in the in management, by union status, 
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Figure 3: Life Satisfaction at different levels of trust  Figure 4: Union members are less trusting only in 
in management, by gender,  management, evidence from ESC (first 4 double 
from the Canadian 2nd wave ESC columns) and GSS
Figure 5: Percentage distribution of trust in  Figure 6: Percentage distribution of trust in 
management, Union and non-union workers management, male & female paid workers
Canadian 2nd-wave ESC Canadian 2nd-wave ESC
Footnote: In the first three figures, the vertical axis is the average life satisfaction, the horizontal axis 
is the scale of trust in management. 
The horizontal axis of Figure 1 also indicates the percentage of workers in each of the categories in 






































































Male FemaleTable 1: Well-being effects of income and workplace trust, from three different surveys
Regression method: Survey Ordered Probit
Survey Canadian ESC-2,  Canadian GSS-17 US Benchmark Survey
Survey year year 2002-03 year 2003 year 2000/01
Sample Paid workers working population working population
Dependent Variable Life satisfaction;  Life satisfaction;  Happiness;
1-10 point scale 1-10 point scale 1-4 point scale
Log of personal income in ESC, log of household 0.199 0.099 0.096
      income in GSS and Benchmark [0.041]** [0.029]** [0.022]**
Trust in management, or trust in co-workers  0.185 0.179 0.098
      in GSS and Benchmark; Standardized score, [0.025]** [0.017]** [0.012]**
Self-perceived health status, scaled 1 to 5 0.284 0.386 0.354
[0.029]** [0.016]** [0.012]**
male -0.134 -0.081 -0.119
[0.039]** [0.026]** [0.025]**
Age Group: 25~34 -0.277 -0.219 -0.029
[0.100]** [0.058]** [0.043]
Age Group: 35~44 -0.255 -0.381 -0.059
[0.107]* [0.060]** [0.038]
Age Group: 45~54 -0.238 -0.413 -0.064
[0.110]* [0.065]** [0.050]
Age Group: 55~64 0.024 -0.31 0.024
[0.121] [0.069]** [0.045]
Age Group: 65 up 0.12 -0.017 0.07
[0.271] [0.185] [0.082]
Marital Status: Married 0.387 0.259 0.264
[0.066]** [0.038]** [0.037]**
Marital Status: As Married 0.376 0.237 0.128
[0.084]** [0.044]** [0.049]*
Marital Status: Divorced -0.176 -0.28 -0.043
[0.102] [0.066]** [0.039]
Marital Status: Separated -0.216 -0.105 -0.226
[0.115] [0.056] [0.066]**
Marital Status: Widowed -0.156 -0.227 -0.057
[0.200] [0.124] [0.071]
Education: High school -0.123 -0.283 0.115
[0.096] [0.061]** [0.048]*
Education: Between -0.114 -0.262 0.119
[0.085] [0.054]** [0.052]*
Education: With University Degree -0.159 -0.378 0.037
[0.090] [0.060]** [0.053]
Contacts with family member outside household 0.154 0.232 0.161
[0.072]* [0.045]** [0.032]**
Contacts with friends 0.425 0.221 0.111
[0.086]** [0.056]** [0.010]**
Contacts with neighbours 0.09 0.067 0.153
[0.074] [0.047] [0.048]**
Number of memberships or extent of activity 0.007 0.021 0.284
[0.013] [0.033] [0.066]**
Trust in general 0.112 -0.076 0.175
[0.048]* [0.031]* [0.022]**
trust in neighbours 0.221 0.243 0.25[0.064]** [0.069]** [0.048]**
Trust or confidence in police 0.168 0.342 0.349
[0.099] [0.065]** [0.040]**
Importance of religion 0.162 0.189 0.2
[0.088] [0.051]** [0.053]**
Frequency of attending religious services -0.046 -0.066 0.168
[0.100] [0.056] [0.034]**
cut1:Constant 1.203 -0.448 0.537
[0.377]** [0.330] [0.221]*
cut2:Constant 1.371 -0.128 1.592
[0.374]** [0.317] [0.231]**
cut3:Constant 1.516 0.219 3.942
[0.376]** [0.309] [0.226]**













Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note 1:  Self-employed is excluded in the two Canadian surveys.
             US benchmark survey does not provide information on self-employment status. Therefore the 
             sample may include self-employed.
Note 2:  Appendix Table 1 has the descriptive statistics.Table 2: Well-being models in ESC-2, by population groups
Regression method: Survey Ordered Probit
Survey Canadian ESC-2, year 2002-3
Sample Paid workers
Dependent Variable Life satisfaction; 1-10 point scale
Sub-sample Male Female Union Non-Union
Special note with other job
attributes on RHS
Log of personal income 0.199 0.158 0.238 0.174 0.22 0.185
[0.041]** [0.042]** [0.055]** [0.059]** [0.073]** [0.046]**
Trust in management 0.185 0.16 0.152 0.217 0.134 0.241
Standardized score, [0.025]** [0.026]** [0.036]** [0.031]** [0.036]** [0.034]**
Self-perceived health status 0.284 0.282 0.292 0.271 0.283 0.283
Scaled 1 to 5 [0.029]** [0.029]** [0.044]** [0.039]** [0.054]** [0.034]**
male -0.134 -0.138 -0.104 -0.139
[0.039]** [0.039]** [0.074] [0.050]**
Age Group: 25~34 -0.277 -0.266 -0.473 -0.071 -0.609 -0.211
[0.100]** [0.099]** [0.134]** [0.138] [0.236]* [0.113]
Age Group: 35~44 -0.255 -0.243 -0.363 -0.133 -0.62 -0.189
[0.107]* [0.106]* [0.140]* [0.151] [0.238]** [0.123]
Age Group: 45~54 -0.238 -0.229 -0.423 -0.057 -0.531 -0.233
[0.110]* [0.111]* [0.152]** [0.154] [0.248]* [0.130]
Age Group: 55~64 0.024 0.022 -0.048 0.118 -0.168 -0.029
[0.121] [0.120] [0.174] [0.181] [0.273] [0.138]
Age Group: 65 up 0.12 0.159 -0.148 0.341 0.148 0.108
[0.271] [0.278] [0.466] [0.327] [0.545] [0.314]
Marital Status: Married 0.387 0.377 0.304 0.477 0.427 0.378
[0.066]** [0.066]** [0.086]** [0.093]** [0.110]** [0.081]**
Marital Status: As Married 0.376 0.36 0.429 0.334 0.642 0.234
[0.084]** [0.086]** [0.119]** [0.112]** [0.135]** [0.109]*
Marital Status: Divorced -0.176 -0.179 -0.233 -0.099 -0.238 -0.119
[0.102] [0.102] [0.141] [0.141] [0.164] [0.123]
Marital Status: Separated -0.216 -0.219 -0.137 -0.226 -0.16 -0.254
[0.115] [0.120] [0.177] [0.153] [0.213] [0.127]*
Marital Status: Widowed -0.156 -0.179 -0.193 -0.126 -0.01 -0.225
[0.200] [0.197] [0.468] [0.221] [0.321] [0.270]
Education: High school -0.123 -0.088 -0.198 -0.028 -0.153 -0.111
[0.096] [0.097] [0.114] [0.148] [0.195] [0.112]
Education: Between -0.114 -0.095 -0.226 0.023 -0.026 -0.169
[0.085] [0.085] [0.115] [0.134] [0.168] [0.107]
Education: With University Degree -0.159 -0.122 -0.219 -0.072 -0.015 -0.232
[0.090] [0.092] [0.117] [0.148] [0.177] [0.107]*
Contacts with family member  0.154 0.148 0.113 0.199 0.124 0.154
outside household [0.072]* [0.072]* [0.098] [0.114] [0.151] [0.092]
Contacts with friends 0.425 0.367 0.376 0.492 0.257 0.482
[0.086]** [0.086]** [0.141]** [0.121]** [0.161] [0.117]**
Contacts with neighbours 0.09 0.039 0.005 0.151 0.165 0.051
[0.074] [0.073] [0.103] [0.113] [0.136] [0.087]
Number of membership or  0.007 0.008 0.002 0.017 0.023 -0.006
extent of activity [0.013] [0.013] [0.020] [0.019] [0.023] [0.017]
Trust in general 0.112 0.116 0.157 0.071 0.161 0.099
[0.048]* [0.046]* [0.061]* [0.073] [0.087] [0.057]
Whole sampletrust in neighbours 0.221 0.211 0.265 0.183 0.046 0.285
[0.064]** [0.063]** [0.089]** [0.095] [0.115] [0.079]**
Trust or confidence in police 0.168 0.17 0.209 0.121 0.121 0.197
[0.099] [0.101] [0.141] [0.134] [0.164] [0.136]
Importance of religion 0.162 0.136 0.119 0.193 0.264 0.125
[0.088] [0.089] [0.140] [0.122] [0.152] [0.114]
Frequency of attending  -0.046 -0.039 -0.046 -0.052 -0.187 0.018
religious services [0.100] [0.101] [0.153] [0.128] [0.160] [0.124]
Dummy, Union Status 0.14
[0.049]**
Job: Requires skill 0.233
[0.110]*
Job: Has variety of tasks 0.393
[0.105]**
Job: Have enough time 0.178
[0.080]*
Job: Free of conflicting demands 0.23
[0.068]**
Job: Makes own decision -0.025
[0.107]
cut1:Constant 1.203 1.469 1.443 1.274 1.036 1.115
[0.377]** [0.380]** [0.553]** [0.569]* [0.714] [0.447]*
cut2:Constant 1.371 1.638 1.678 1.372 1.228 1.273
[0.374]** [0.378]** [0.541]** [0.573]* [0.724] [0.439]**
cut3:Constant 1.516 1.784 1.82 1.522 1.364 1.424
[0.376]** [0.381]** [0.544]** [0.571]** [0.721] [0.438]**
cut4:Constant 1.793 2.065 2.063 1.838 1.643 1.704
[0.370]** [0.377]** [0.538]** [0.554]** [0.713]* [0.425]**
cut5:Constant 2.258 2.537 2.498 2.335 2.024 2.21
[0.373]** [0.382]** [0.552]** [0.559]** [0.724]** [0.427]**
cut6:Constant 2.59 2.874 2.873 2.629 2.333 2.554
[0.378]** [0.387]** [0.561]** [0.566]** [0.726]** [0.432]**
cut7:Constant 3.304 3.597 3.613 3.324 3.127 3.24
[0.378]** [0.387]** [0.564]** [0.570]** [0.730]** [0.433]**
cut8:Constant 4.223 4.528 4.517 4.266 4.057 4.166
[0.381]** [0.389]** [0.568]** [0.574]** [0.732]** [0.437]**
cut9:Constant 4.821 5.134 5.126 4.861 4.673 4.766
[0.380]** [0.389]** [0.574]** [0.578]** [0.734]** [0.439]**
Observations 2480 2478 1209 1271 845 1635
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note 1:  Self-employed is excluded in the two Canadian surveys.
Note 2:  The omitted age group in ESC regressions is age18-24
Note 3:  Please refer to Appendix Table 1 for descriptive statistics by samplesTable 3: Compensating differentials, derived from estimates in table 2
Sample Canadian ESC2, year 2002-3
Sub-sample Paid workers
Subsubsample Whole Male Female Union Non-Union
coefficient of the Log of personal income
0.20 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.19
coefficient of the standardized score of trust in management
0.19 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.24
Ratio of coefficients*
0.93 0.64 1.25 0.61 1.30
Approximated percentage income change associated with one third of a standard deviation,
such a movment covers roughly 10% of the sample**
31% 21% 42% 20% 43%
Standard error** 7% 6% 14% 8% 10%
* The ratio of coefficients from the ordered probit estimation can be interpreted as the ratio of marginal
   effects of two variables. 
   The ratios of coefficients are very similar when OLS estimations are used instead of Ordered Probit.
** It is simply one third of the ratio expressed in percentage term.
**Standard error is calculated from the Delta method from the variance co-variance matrix of the 
   estimated coefficientsAppendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: 
ESC:
Sample: Canadian ESC Paid workers Paid workers Paid workers
Union Members Non Union Members
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Stdev Obs Mean Stdev
Life satisfaction, 1-10 point scale 2523 7.95 1.63 858 8.05 1.58 1665 7.90 1.65
Job satisfaction, 1-10 point scale 2523 7.26 1.88 858 6.95 1.94 1665 7.42 1.83
Log of personal income 2523 10.45 0.70 858 10.59 0.55 1665 10.38 0.76
Log of personal income per work hour 2427 6.84 0.65 827 7.00 0.54 1600 6.75 0.68
Working part time 2523 0.13 0.33 858 0.13 0.33 1665 0.12 0.33
Work hours 2427 38.60 9.32 827 37.64 8.70 1600 39.10 9.60
Age 2484 40.49 10.57 847 42.70 9.90 1637 39.35 10.73
Male 2523 0.48 0.50 858 0.44 0.50 1665 0.51 0.50
Married 2523 0.52 0.50 858 0.55 0.50 1665 0.51 0.50
Education: With University Degree 2523 0.34 0.47 858 0.37 0.48 1665 0.32 0.47
Trust in management, 1-10 point 2523 6.73 2.28 858 5.95 2.30 1665 7.14 2.16
Trust in general, 0-1 scale 2523 0.65 0.47 858 0.67 0.46 1665 0.64 0.48
Confidence that neighbor will return the wallet, 0-1 2523 0.65 0.34 858 0.66 0.33 1665 0.65 0.35
Confidence that police will return the wallet, 0-1 2523 0.83 0.28 858 0.83 0.28 1665 0.83 0.28
Job: Requires skill, 0-1 scale 2522 0.78 0.27 857 0.81 0.25 1665 0.76 0.27
Job: Has variety of tasks, 0-1 scale 2523 0.86 0.23 858 0.87 0.21 1665 0.85 0.24
Job: Have enough time, 0-1 scale 2523 0.65 0.32 858 0.59 0.34 1665 0.69 0.31
Job: Free of conflicting demands, 0-1 scale 2522 0.51 0.33 858 0.47 0.33 1664 0.53 0.33
Job: Makes own decision, 0-1 scale 2523 0.77 0.29 858 0.74 0.29 1665 0.78 0.28
Sense of job security, 1-4 scale 2487 3.25 0.86 849 3.30 0.86 1638 3.22 0.87
Dummy: Union member 2523 0.34 0.47 858 1.00 0.00 1665
Dummy: immigrant 2523 0.21 0.41 858 0.18 0.38 1665 0.23 0.42
Dummy: Visible Minority 2523 0.13 0.33 858 0.09 0.29 1665 0.15 0.35
Sample: Canadian ESC Paid workers Paid workers
Male Female
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean d. Dev.
Life satisfaction, 1-10 point scale 1220 7.91 1.63 1303 7.99 1.62
Job satisfaction, 1-10 point scale 1220 7.25 1.85 1303 7.27 1.91
Log of personal income 1220 10.64 0.68 1303 10.27 0.67
Log of personal income per work hour 1169 6.94 0.66 1258 6.74 0.63
Working part time 1220 0.06 0.24 1303 0.19 0.39
Work hours 1169 41.53 8.34 1258 35.88 9.37
Age 1211 40.07 10.58 1273 40.90 10.56
Male 1220 1.00 0.00 1303 0.00 0.00
Married 1220 0.51 0.50 1303 0.53 0.50
Education: With University Degree 1220 0.34 0.48 1303 0.33 0.47
Trust in management, 1-10 point 1220 6.67 2.26 1303 6.80 2.30
Trust in general, 0-1 scale 1220 0.64 0.47 1303 0.66 0.47
Confidence that neighbor will return the wallet, 0-1 1220 0.65 0.34 1303 0.66 0.34
Confidence that police will return the wallet, 0-1 1220 0.83 0.29 1303 0.83 0.27
Job: Requires skill, 0-1 scale 1220 0.80 0.26 1302 0.76 0.27
Job: Has variety of tasks, 0-1 scale 1220 0.86 0.23 1303 0.86 0.23
Job: Have enough time, 0-1 scale 1220 0.68 0.31 1303 0.63 0.33
Job: Free of conflicting demands, 0-1 scale 1219 0.53 0.33 1303 0.49 0.33
Job: Makes own decision, 0-1 scale 1220 0.79 0.27 1303 0.74 0.29
Sense of job security, 1-4 scale 1203 3.24 0.85 1284 3.26 0.88
Dummy: Union member 1220 0.31 0.46 1303 0.37 0.48
Dummy: immigrant 1220 0.25 0.43 1303 0.18 0.39
Dummy: Visible Minority 1220 0.14 0.35 1303 0.12 0.32Canadian GSS
Sample: Canadian GSS working population
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Life satisfaction 7.95 1.42
trust in co-workers 3.82 0.97
Identifiable Minority, include most asian ethnicities and aboriginals 0.23 0.42
immigrant status 0.18 0.38
year since immigration 3.88 10.23
age 39.51 11.43
% married 0.52 0.50
% male 0.55 0.50
log of household income 11.05 0.55
log of personal income 10.50 0.66
Mastery Scale 0.25 0.14
Health Status 3.91 0.91
University degress 0.26 0.44
Frequency of Visiting Relatives 0.50 0.30
Friendship 0.67 0.26
Contact with neighbours 0.52 0.32
membership 0.42 0.41
general trust 0.57 0.49
trust in neighbours 0.67 0.26
confidence in police 0.73 0.24
importance of religion 0.45 0.39
Frequency of attending religious services 0.31 0.36
% union 0.32 0.47
* We are not allowed to publish detail sample size of GSS
US Benchmark
Sample: US Benchmark Working population 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Happiness: 1-4 point scale 16519 3.33 0.58
Log of household income 16519 10.79 0.68
age 16519 39.75 12.08
male 16519 0.46 0.50
married 16519 0.52 0.50
Education: With University Degree 16519 0.40 0.49
Trust in co-workers, 1-4 scale 16519 3.40 0.79
general trust, 0-1 scale 16519 0.55 0.48
Trust in neighbours, 0-1 scale 16220 0.75 0.28
Confidence in police, 0-1 scale 16305 0.76 0.28
Dummy: union member 16519 0.13 0.34
Non Hispanic White 16519 0.75 0.43